Saturday, August 2, 2008

UK group assesses Islamism as a major security threat

This article was published in March in the prestigious UK Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) journal.  RUSI is a recognized authority on British defense.
 
It deals with a variety of defense threats. About domestic Islamism it states:
 

Islamist terrorism is where people tend to begin. The United Kingdom presents itself as a target, as a fragmenting, post- Christian society, increasingly divided about interpretations of its history, about its national aims, its values and in its political identity. That fragmentation is worsened by the firm self-image of those elements within it who refuse to integrate. This is a problem worsened by the lack of leadership from the majority which in mis- placed deference to 'multi-culturalism' failed to lay down the line to immigrant communities, thus undercutting those within them trying to fight extremism. The country's lack of self-confidence is in stark contrast to the implacability of its Islamist terrorist enemy, within and without.

We live under threat. We sense that now is a time of remission, between the frontal attack of 9/11, and its eventual successor, which may deliver an even greater psychological blow. Significant though they were in their different ways, neither the 2004 Madrid train bombings (which affected a national election), nor the London Underground and Bus bombings of July 2005 (which exposed the weakness of the 'multi-cultural' approach towards lslamists) were that successor. Thus, we are in a confused and vulnerable condition. Some believe that we are already at war; but all may agree that generally a peace-time mentality prevails. In all three ways - our social fragmentation, the sense of premonition and the divisions about what our stance should be - there are uneasy similarities with the years just before the First World War.

We are fortunate in not having the specific external state enemies who once posed threats to the British state and against whom we could therefore define ourselves. There has been no straight substitution of the Cold War threat with another threat of different source but similar type. But the range and nature of the threats to the security of British citizens in 2008 are not confined solely to what the lslamists call their 'jihad' against the West.

Those are pretty strong words that outline the dilemmas faced by much of Europe in facing Islamism. Few real remedies are offered, however, except to set up committees in the time honored fashion and to plead for an increase in defense spending. Neither of these remedies is really relevant to the issue of domestic Islamism, is it?  

Ami Isseroff


Risk, Threat and Security: The Case of the United Kingdom

Posted on: Wednesday, 26 March 2008, 03:00 CDT

By Prins, Gwyn Salisbury, Robert

This article expresses the consensus of a private seminar series which met at intervals between May 2006 and January 2008. In addition to the authors those participating included Sir Mark Allen, Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham, Chris Donnelly, Field Marshal the Lord Inge, Tom Kremer, Lord Leach, Baroness Park of Monmouth, Douglas Slater, General Sir Rupert Smith, and Professor Hew Strachan.* The security of the United Kingdom is at risk and under threat. The mismatch between the country's military commitments and the funding of its defence moved Lords Bramall, Boyce, Craig, Cuthrie and Inge - five former Chiefs of the Defence Staff - to take the unusual step of raising their concerns publicly in a House of Lords Defence debate on 22 November 2007. A public forum - the Defence Association - has also been established to investigate and articulate the crisis they identify. Security is not only a question for Chiefs of the Defence Staff. It matters to every citizen of the United Kingdom. security is the primary function of the state, for without it there can be no state, and no rule of law. The former Chiefs of the Defence Staff have stepped outside their traditional reticence to speak on behalf of all. Anxiety about defence and security runs far and wide.

This essay addresses the bases of that anxiety: the sources of risk and threat, both overseas and at home. It argues that weaknesses at home, particularly divisions in our attitudes to our defence, contribute to turning risks into threats. It proposes that positive steps to strengthen and update our defence and security efforts involve returning to long established constitutional arrangements of the Queen in Parliament. Thus we may meet the needs of today and tomorrow. Our proposal is not a finely detailed blueprint. It is more fundamental. It describes the operating principles and the dynamics of constitutional machinery with the necessary strength to match present threat and future risk

How to realign our defence effort to changing risks and threats is not merely a technocratic question to be answered internally by the defence and security establishments within government. Repeated assertions by ministers that all is well, that the matter is well in hand and can be safely left to them to manage in-house, no longer carry conviction.

Uncertainty

The electorate is uncertain and anxious. People feel uncertainty about military adventures overseas which have cost many lives and have pushed our armed forces to the limits. They are worried about security at home since the successful terrorist attack of 7/7, the similar attack a fortnight later which was only averted by the incompetence of its perpetrators, and the narrowly preempted attacks on planes in 2006. In the summer of 2007, there were also carbomb attempts at Glasgow airport and in the West End of London. The 'war on terror' is with us now in all its ugliness.

Both current military operations and the war on terror together raise a deeper point. Is there any longer a clear distinction between being at war and not being at war? A declaration of war is almost inconceivable today, and yet both our defence and security services are in action against active forces, abroad and at home, at this moment. The electorate sees this paradox. It also worries about the way we were committed to war, especially in Iraq, and about Washington's sway and leadership...

Such uncertainty should be of primary concern because it weakens the bond between government and the governed, which is precisely what terrorists seek to achieve and what other enemies of the United Kingdom will exploit. For this reason, it is not enough for anyone (even Her Majesty's Government) to say, 'Don't worry, we have it in hand'. The uncertainty has to be addressed. The confidence and loyalty of the people are the wellspring from which flows the power with which all threats to defence and security are ultimately met. Our constitutional arrangements and institutional dispositions must both deserve and grow out of that loyalty and confidence. The present uncertainty suggests our arrangements need review and renewal.

Risk and Threat

Latent risks can become patent threats. What marks the change of a risk into a threat is usually the emergence of a factor which has been misjudged. It has been the reduction of traditional threats (aggression from nation states) combined with the increase of possible risk factors (most notably, Islamist terrorism, but there are many others) which has so destabilised world affairs and increased uncertainty. Linked to these changes is a loss in the United Kingdom of confidence in our own identity, values, constitution and institutions. 'This England that was wont to conquer others', wrote Shakespeare, 'hath made a shameful conquest of itself.' This is one of the main factors which have precipitated risks into threats. As long as it persists, it will have the power to do so again.

Islamist terrorism is where people tend to begin. The United Kingdom presents itself as a target, as a fragmenting, post- Christian society, increasingly divided about interpretations of its history, about its national aims, its values and in its political identity. That fragmentation is worsened by the firm self-image of those elements within it who refuse to integrate. This is a problem worsened by the lack of leadership from the majority which in mis- placed deference to 'multi-culturalism' failed to lay down the line to immigrant communities, thus undercutting those within them trying to fight extremism. The country's lack of self-confidence is in stark contrast to the implacability of its Islamist terrorist enemy, within and without.

We live under threat. We sense that now is a time of remission, between the frontal attack of 9/11, and its eventual successor, which may deliver an even greater psychological blow. Significant though they were in their different ways, neither the 2004 Madrid train bombings (which affected a national election), nor the London Underground and Bus bombings of July 2005 (which exposed the weakness of the 'multi-cultural' approach towards lslamists) were that successor. Thus, we are in a confused and vulnerable condition. Some believe that we are already at war; but all may agree that generally a peace-time mentality prevails. In all three ways - our social fragmentation, the sense of premonition and the divisions about what our stance should be - there are uneasy similarities with the years just before the First World War.

We are fortunate in not having the specific external state enemies who once posed threats to the British state and against whom we could therefore define ourselves. There has been no straight substitution of the Cold War threat with another threat of different source but similar type. But the range and nature of the threats to the security of British citizens in 2008 are not confined solely to what the lslamists call their 'jihad' against the West.

A shifting complex of risks faces us. An adequate approach to Britain's security in the next few years must address questions that are intricate, delicate and strange to our conventional way of thinking. The familiar categories of 'home' and 'abroad', which have long reassured the British in a deep part of their national identity, are breaking down. We know much less about what threatens us and how it does so than our official policies assert.

Six categories of risk can be identified. Any one of these may ignite the powder trails in and between any of the others. The examples we employ are not exhaustive but illustrative.

Geo-strategic fundamentals do not change, but new sources of power are at play within them

There are unchanging geo-political factors of trade, distance, trade routes and choke-points vital to the United Kingdom's well- being. Yet while British reliance on sea traffic is increasing, our policy-makers seem to suffer from 'sea blindness'. They have not yet noticed or, if they have, have not reacted to the weakening of the Royal Navy. The Navy is set rapidly to shrink in size and in capability because of the failure to maintain construction and establishment during the last decade. (We emphasise this point here not because there are not grave shortcomings throughout the services, but because naval force structure, once lost, is especially difficult to recover.) Likewise, the other fixed geopolitical fact is that Britain is an island adjacent to continental Europe. Our security depends upon continental arrangements not encroaching on our basic freedoms, that do not sap but amplify our strengths and that do not traduce the limits of public consent.

The old surfs the new

Standing astride the old fundamentals are actors who deploy against us both old and very new sources of moral and material power. The jihadists deploy the power of conviction that comes from a sectarian understanding of religion. They also surf the internet and use it to their advantage and our peril. They are not state- bound, but can take over part or all of a state, as has happened in Afghanistan and Somalia, and as could happen in Pakistan. That is why 'home' and 'abroad' are now seamlessly interlinked in such troubling ways. There is new competition for resources

...

The politics of climate change represent unexpected pressures

Climate change has now been added to the more familiar factors governing the competition for resources, and the security implications that flow from that competition. World food stocks may fall as demand increases for plant-based feedstock for biofuels. China and India have both made it plain that they will not constrain their economic growth to curtail emissions of man-made greenhouse gases. Can the Chinese Communist Party cope with political pressures rising from pervasive domestic pollution of air, land and water? The present failure of the Kyoto Protocol and the probable future failure of any successor built on the same flawed structural assumptions lay the ground for future conflicts of interest. This is a new source of tension between the advanced industrial regions, the demographic superpowers, and the rest; and it represents a simple operation of the Law of Unintended Consequences. The Law is greatly to be respected in developing a viable defence and security establishment. It turns risks into threats.

The problem of Russia is re-emerging

President Putin is showing considerable skill in mixing the old with the new. He has answered, with troubling clarity, the question in Alexandr Blok's poem: as Russia, the Sphynx, gazes at Europe, sometimes with hatred, sometimes with love; which sentiment predominates? A new Russian nationalism is being promoted. Proud in its wealth of oil and gas, this nationalism revels in its isolation and its contempt for the 'soft' West. It is ready to expropriate property, to break contracts, to hint at energy blackmail, and to pursue opponents wherever they are - for instance in the unprecedented 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia, in which state resources were apparently complicit. The opportunity to engage Russia in the world economy efficiently (as opposed to colluding with robber baron capitalism) was squandered by those from the West who gave advice in the 1990s. We are yet to see the full bill for these errors. Meanwhile, both birth rates and life expectancy in Russia continue dramatically to slide, compounding the ferocity of the new nationalism with a tragic urgency.

Multilateral institutions are weakening

Currently, for essentially ideological reasons, the United Kingdom continues to invest much effort and faith in three supranational institutions: the UN, NATO and the EU. The current Prime Minister restated that investment as his central credo in his first Mansion House foreign policy speech in November 2007. Yet all are simultaneously weakening. Originally intended as alliances to support agreed ends, they have lost their way and no longer offer their members the benefits once covenanted. What are the essential features of alliances worthy of that name? Shared essential values; shared culture, and especially military culture; shared interests; and, most basic of all, trust - trust enough to permit the special intelligence relationships enjoyed by the UK for the last sixty years with Australia, Canada, the US and New Zealand. We have only to look at destinations for British emigration, and at world-wide phone traffic patterns, to see where our practical preferences are exercised.

What does all this - and particularly the last - mean for the United Kingdom? Coalitions of the willing are the only lasting kind; nations do not have permanent friends, only permanent interests. Foul weather friends are to be preferred to fair weather friends; and the British people know precisely which are which. The English- speaking world manifestly close friends - and, less openly, those with interests common to ours, emerge as our main diplomatic resource. In making our choices, however, we need to know who we are ourselves and what we stand for. How else should we ourselves be reliable allies to others? Once we know these things and admit them, we can restore our divided house to harmony and thence to security.

...

The deep guarantee of real strength is our knowledge of who we are. Our loss of cultural self-confidence weakens our ability to develop new means to provide for our security in the face of new risks. Our uncertainty incubates the embryonic threats these risks represent. We look like a soft touch. We are indeed a soft touch, from within and without.

...

We need to remind ourselves of the first principles which govern priorities in liberal democracies. Defence and security must be restored as the first duty of government. The trust and mutual obligations between government, people and the defence forces must be reasserted. Our common understanding of and allegiance to the United Kingdom must be restored. We have a powerful history and a sound constitution, fit for the state's essential role as the ultimate guarantor of the individual's safety, freedom and security.

In that spirit, now may be an opportune moment to offer a further and complementary proposal for institutional change in the area of defence and security. But before doing so, let us be realistic about the role of such changes. Institutions do not guarantee sound analysis or clear thinking any more than they engender political will. It is a common error to conflate legislating with doing. Individuals do the analysis, the thinking and the determining. Institutions facilitate these. They can only provide the best possible spaces and the clearest lines of communication within and through which people come together to make these things happen. Institutional improvements such as we advocate here are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the improvement of British security.

Aim of the Proposal

The aim is to match three needs: addressing the full range of strategic risks and threats coherently and consistently within government, instead of ad hoc; doing so in a manner which as far as possible escapes the traps of partisan and political-cycle factors, without doing violence to the principles of parliamentary government; and building political consensus so that public opinion can feel confidence in the political process, without the detailed mediation of the press - for these, of course, are matters that often need to be confidential, if not secret. This would represent a virtuous circle.

Twin Committees

We propose twin committees: one a Cabinet Committee (of ministers, with service personnel and officials not just formally in attendance, but actually as full members), and the other a Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament.

A key aspect of the proposal is that, although the Joint Committee would need a very small staff in each House, the two Committees should essentially share a staff within the Cabinet Office.

Functions

The Cabinet Committee would draw together all the threads of government relating to defence and security, whether at home or abroad. It would be 'somewhere for anyone to go' in raising concerns. It would draw all parts of government into strategy and planning, as required. Its key function would be strategic: assessing risks and threats, and our capabilities in addressing them, in order to make judgements as to the balance and proportions of policy across the full spectrum of government activity. It would not be concerned directly with operational matters. It would not be concerned directly with the allocation of resources, but would have an influential voice when a clear need for resources was not being met. Its principal task would be to exercise judgement as to the necessary levels of capability and the overall balance of effort and planning, long term.

The Joint Committee would provide a parallel institution within Parliament to monitor Government assessments and strategy, to make available the perspective of politicians from other parties (and none)/and to act, in so far as it saw fit, to build consensus in Parliament for Government policy, or to raise awareness in Parliament of gaps in Government policy. It would not be inquisitorial, in the sense of investigating or scrutinising past actions by Government departments or agencies. It would have the power to report to the Houses as it saw fit, and so recommend matters for debate.

Membership of the Committees

The members of the Cabinet Committee would be ministers, defence staff and officials as ordered by the Prime Minister: the normal arrangement for such a Committee. The departments and agencies to be represented would probably include the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development, the Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Home Office. Others who were not permanent members might need to attend from time to time - for example, the heads of the security services, Lord Chancellor or Attorney General (for constitutional issues impacting on the freedom of the individual) or ministers from the departments responsible for schools or higher education.

The membership of the Joint Committee would of course be a matter for the two Houses: but we propose two innovations to be established as conventions. First, all members should be appointed with the expectation of serving for at least a full Parliament, and normally for a fixed number of years. secondly, all members should already be Privy Counsellors, or be appointed so on joining the Committee. This would emphasise the seniority of the Joint Committee and allow its deliberations to take place on Privy Council terms. It would also allow it to meet together with the Cabinet Committee if circumstances required.

Chairmen

We believe that these committees could become very important. This being so, for two reasons we suggest that the Prime Minister be not given chairmanship. First, the new committees are organs of analysis and overview, not executive organs. They will report to and thus empower the Prime Minister's executive committees. The best military, political and business experience shows that sound and decisive leadership involves delegation. Leadership can then be quiet, creative and clear. secondly, we seek by re-engagement to stimulate the sinews, nerves and muscles of the whole parliamentary body politic that has grown flaccid from under use. It is imprudent and counter-productive to overburden a Prime Minister with detailed chairing commitments. Therefore, a senior Cabinet minister would chair the Cabinet Committee. This, together with responsibility for the Cabinet Office staff of the committees, should be a substantial, if not the major, part of his or her remit. One of the sinecure posts, ideally Lord President, would clearly be appropriate for this. The Committee would report, as appropriate, direct to the Cabinet or to the Prime Minister's own defence and overseas policy committee. A senior member of the Opposition, possibly but not necessarily with Cabinet experience, should chair the Joint Committee.

Conclusion

This new structure of committees would have an important symbolic function, as well as a practical one. It would demonstrate to the public that the widest view of defence and security was taken within government and within Parliament. It would show that the whole range of risks and threats was being managed.

It would help both ministers and officials comprehend the interrelated nature of today's risks and the emergence of threats. It would help them build the underlying policies in support of operational strategies. It would be a guarantee of the coherence and legitimacy of operations in the eyes of the public.

It would reduce the appearance of short-term political advantage in the deployment of our defence forces and promote acceptance of necessary provision for defence and security. Most importantly, it would preserve and safeguard the authority of Parliament.

Our world has entered into a dangerous phase of uncertainty. In the United Kingdom, frustration with our piecemeal and erratic response to new threats has sapped the strengths we know we have. In reaffirming a political settlement that has served us well, by accepting some considered institutional innovation, we shall be better able to meet what lies ahead, and extend to our allies the support we owe them, helping them in turn to support us.

'The country's lack of self-confidence Is in stark contrast to the implacability of its Islamist terrorist enemy, within and without.' A policeman stands at a cordon in a London street after a failed car bomb attack, 29 June 2007.

Our loss of cultural self-confidence', Prins and Salisbury argue, 'weakens our ability to develop new means to provide for our security in the face of new risks.' British Prime Minister Cordon Brown talks with British troops at their base in the southern Iraqi city of Basra, 2 October 2007. REUTERS/Lefteris Pitarakis.

* Sir Mark Allen is a retired member of HM Diplomatic Service; Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham is a former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff; Chris Donnelly is a Director of the Institute of State & Governance, Oxford and Senior Fellow of the Defence Academy, Field Marshal the Lord Inge is a former Chief of Defence Staff; Tom Kremer is author of The Missing Heart of Europe; Lord Leach is an international banker; Baroness Park of Monmouth is a former member of SIS and diplomat; Douglas Slater is a former Clerk of the House of Lords; General Sir Rupert Smith is a former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe and author of The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World; and Professor Hew Strachan is Chichele Professor of the History of War at All Souls College, Oxford.

Gwyn Prins is a Professor at the London School of Economics. Robert Salisbury is the Marquess of Salisbury and a Privy Councillor.

Copyright Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies Feb 2008

(c) 2008 RUSI Journal; Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies. Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning. All rights Reserved.

Source: RUSI Journal; Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies

Thursday, July 31, 2008

Full text of Olmert resignation speech

"You won't have Olmert to kick around any more."
Mr Olmert has a rather different view of his performance than most of us.
 
 
As a citizen of a democratic state I have always believed that when a prime minister is elected in Israel, even those who voted against him at the polls are obligated to desire his success. Instead of gaining that basic trust, however, I found myself subject to a wave of investigations, examinations and criticism immediately after being elected. Practically from my first day in the Prime Minister's Office I was forced to repulse malicious assaults, while I was busy making critical decisions pertinent to Israel's security and existence. Still, during my term Israel's situation continued to improve.
 
In the security arena, we strengthened the Israel Defense Forces: We continued to build up its might and greatly increased its resources. There is calm in the north and it is not under any immediate threat. Israel's deterrent capability has improved beyond recognition. We also learned our lessons and rectified our mistakes. The self-examination processes are essential mechanisms to a healthy society - I am proud of them. 
  
In the economic and social spheres we have maintained a stable economy and brought it to significant achievements. We stepped up the struggle against poverty and the level of involvement in distressed areas, particularly in the periphery. The number of poor people continues to decline. We invested one billion shekels in an attempt to improve the education system. We increased old-age allowances, we focused on helping at-risk children and established a system to provide care for very young children, whose needs we had ignored for years.
 
We achieved a positive record in employment figures: Hundreds of thousands joined the workforce. Unemployment dropped to 6.1 percent, compared to 10.5 percent three years ago. Beyond all these, I continue to believe with all my heart that achieving peace, the cessation of terror, strengthening security, creating a different relationship with our neighbors - these are the most essential goals for Israel's future. The support of the United States, under George W. Bush's leadership, is a great help toward these goals. We are closer than ever to concrete understandings that will likely serve as a basis for agreements in our dialogues with both the Palestinians and the Syrians. On the day the dream of peace comes true we will all stand and wonder: How did we not achieve this sooner? As long as I remain at my post I will not stop trying to continue to bring the negotiations between us and our neighbors to a successful conclusion that embodies hope. In my position as prime minister I bear the highest responsibility for decisions. There are outstanding people in this country. Together with them I have led far-reaching, daring and complex processes. I never tried to boast about these achievements in public for political gain. Most of them are concealed from the majority of the public, but are well-known to the executors and the partners in those decisions.
 
The entire time I was forced to defend myself from ceaseless attacks by the self-appointed soldiers of justice, who sought to oust me from my position. I am the prime minister, and am naturally a target for political struggle. But every intelligent person knows that things are totally out of proportion. Have I made mistakes in my many years of political activity? Of course! I am sorry and regret them. But is the true picture of things the one that is presented to the public? Not at all! As prime minister I am denied the elementary right of presumed innocence, in the absence of the ability to present it at the height of a forced process, in which I must be silent. I want to make one thing clear: I am proud to be a citizen of a country in which a prime minister can be investigated like any other citizen. It is the duty of the police to investigate. It is the duty of the State Prosecutor's Office to instruct the police, and I have nothing against them for that. The prime minister is not above the law, but neither is he beneath it.
 
This is not my personal problem. This is a challenge for our ability, as a state, to maintain the stability and balance of the democratic regime. Neither a clerk, nor a junior or senior investigator, nor a lawyer no matter how important and honest - as are the vast majority in the police and the State Prosecutor's Office - has the right or the authority to decide whether the prime minister can serve or continue his duties. Such decisions should be made after a responsible, quiet, orderly process, as in every democratic country. Unfortunately, that orderly process is no longer taking place here.
 
It is my duty to responsibly conduct a personal accounting for us all, even if it hurts, even if it requires decisions that involve a personal price. This could be a milestone for the future of our democratic lives. Perhaps I, today, with my personal decision, am opening a window to a better reality.
 
I reiterate what I have already said. I have complete and satisfying answers. I will not conduct this discourse in the media or at a press conference, but rather a balanced and fair struggle, as I have done my whole life. Those preaching to me today will one day have to contend with the truth, as it will come out before them. They know this very well. Now the moment has come for me to make a decision. I am not doing this out of a sense that I cannot fulfill my duties. I believe, with all my being, in my ability to continue fulfilling my mission, as I believe my own honesty and innocence. But the current campaign of abuse, even by honest people who truly care about the state and its image, raises a question that I do not want to and cannot evade. What is more important? My private justice, or the public good? My private justice is very important to me. The infringement of my family's privacy pains me exceedingly. In the choice between the considerations of my status and ability to struggle for my justice, and the considerations of the good of the state, the latter are more important!!!
 
I have therefore decided not to run in the Kadima party primaries. Nor do I intend to intervene in the internal elections, in keeping with the decision I proposed, and their outcome has my blessing. My decision was not made out of bitterness, nor in an atmosphere of preaching. I have come to say only a little of what has been in my heart for many months. When a new party chairman is elected I will resign my position as prime minister, in order to permit the newly elected chairman to form another government, quickly and efficiently. I believe that there is a broad public foundation for such a government and that it will be established within a short time. I will step aside properly, in a respectable, fair and responsible fashion, just as I have served throughout my term. Then I will prove my innocence. We have a singular, wonderful country, unlike any other in the world. I love it with all my heart and soul, and I am grateful to you, the citizens of Israel, for the right you gave me to act on your behalf.

Wednesday, July 30, 2008

Olmert Quits

Israeli PM Ehud Olmert announced this evening that he will not participate in the Kadima party primaries and will resign when the next head of the party has been elected. [MidEastWeb Middle East News Service ].
 
Below is an earlier report speculating on the content of the speech.
 
Ami Isseroff
 
 Last update - 20:10 30/07/2008       
Olmert: Prime minister is not above or below law
By Barak Ravid, Haaretz Correspondent and Haaretz Service
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert delivered a statement to the public from his official residence in Jerusalem on Wednesday evening.
 
The surprise announcement did not detail what subject Olmert would address. Political sources said they believed Olmert would announce a decision not to run in an upcoming leadership contest in his Kadima party, scheduled for September 17. This decision could in effect mean an end to Olmert's political career.
 
Olmert began the address by saying that despite having been beset by investigations during his tenure, he has improved the situation in Israel and continues to believe that peace is the most important track for the country.
 
The prime minister went on to say that as long as he was in power, he would work toward this goal of peace.
 
"I am proud to be the prime minister of a country that investigates its prime ministers," he said. "The prime minister is not above the law, but he is in no way below it."
 
The prime minister has been under official criminal investigation in recent months over allegations of corruption in his former capacities as Jerusalem mayor and trade minister.
 
The two most prominent investigations involve suspicions that Olmert took bribes from American businessman Morris Talansky, and charges he submitted duplicate claims for travel expenses which he allegedly used to fund family trips abroad. He has denied wrongdoing, but said he would resign if indicted.
 
Olmert's announcement comes a day after Kadima said it had scheduled its leadership vote, an election that could lead to Olmert's ouster. Olmert has not said publicly whether he intends to run.
 
The prime minister's advisers in recent days have split into two groups: those who expect him to continue in his position and resign only if indicted, and those who have been urging him not to run in the primary elections and conclude his term with an air of respect.
 

On a different note, other analysts have surmised that during the address on Wednesday the prime minister will discuss developments in Israel's indirect negotiations with Syria, the fourth round of which ended in Turkey on Wednesday.

Tuesday, July 29, 2008

U.S. gives Israel missile detecting technology

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The United States will provide Israel with a radar system used to detect and track missile and rocket attacks, a senior Pentagon official told CNN Tuesday.

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak says the technology will be running before Bush leaves office.

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak says the technology will be running before Bush leaves office.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the U.S. assistance will include an agreement to facilitate the sharing of U.S. "early warning" launch data and technical and financial help developing defenses against shorter range rockets and mortars.

The technology is called X-band frequency, which has microwave range and provides for ultra-high very precise resolution. It is able to distinguish between real missiles, decoys and debris.

The technology would be running before "the new [U.S.] administration arrives" in January, Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak said, according to Israel's Haaretz newspaper.

The plan for assistance was announced after Barak met with Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Tuesday.

At Tuesday's Pentagon briefing, spokesman Geoff Morrell said, "What we are committed to is exploring additional defensive capabilities for Israel."

The senior Pentagon official said the United States will base the X-band radar in Israel, and use it for the benefit of both countries.

Israel has also asked for a "substantial" U.S. investment in Israel's "Iron Dome" and "David's Sling" short-range defensive systems, the source said. The U.S. recently agreed to provide Israel $30 billion over the next decade

Middle East Humor: Fadlallah claims Shi'a do not have different aims from Sunni in Lebanon

Hezbollah "spiritual leader" Fadlallah has a great sense of humor:
 
BEIRUT: Senior Shiite cleric Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah rejected the notion Monday that Shiites have any project that differs from that of their Sunni brethren.
 
Apart from murdering Sunni leaders and attempting to impose an Islamic republic on the Lebanese people, Sayyid Fadlala is right, no? I mean, what are a few assassination and a little war between friends?
 
Fadlallah got one thing right, though:
 
"We are looking forward to one Islamic project that embraces big Islamic issues," Fadlallah said in an interview with Kuwaiti Ad-Dar newspaper.
You betcha - they want one Islamic project, run from Tehran.
 
Ami Isseroff
 
 
Daily Star staff
Tuesday, July 29, 2008
 
BEIRUT: Senior Shiite cleric Sayyed Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah rejected the notion Monday that Shiites have any project that differs from that of their Sunni brethren.
 
"We are looking forward to one Islamic project that embraces big Islamic issues," Fadlallah said in an interview with Kuwaiti Ad-Dar newspaper.
 
Fadlallah said a Sunni-Shiite strife, in the full sense of the word, did not occur in Lebanon.
 
"But there are leaders who want to build their leaderships on a sectarian basis in addition to some Arab countries that encourage and finance such desire," he added.
 
Fadlallah said the visit to Najaf of Future Movement leader Saad Hariri cannot have a "big influence as it moves through economics and not politics."
 
The cleric also said he rejected claims that the Shiites were affiliated with Iran.
 
"The problem is in the Arabs' affiliation with the US," he said. "As for the Shiites, some of them support Iran and some don't."
 
"And if some Sunni officials are following US policies, we cannot say Sunnis are the allies of the US and Israel," he added.
 
Meanwhile, the vice president of the Higher Shiite Council, Sheikh Abdel-Amir Qabalan, said mobile fighting between one Lebanese region and another "is forbidden."
 
"What happened in North Lebanon is a diabolic act. It harms our national and religious values as well as the interests of our country and society," Qabalan said in reference to recent clashes in Tripoli.
 
Qabalan voiced "surprise" that the issue of the resistance is the "controversial material" in the drafting of the ministerial statement of the new national unity government.
 
"We should preserve the resistance so it constitutes a reserve army for the defense of Lebanon," he said.
 
Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir said on Monday that giving Lebanese emigrants a card allowing them to vote in the upcoming 2009 elections is a "good step."
 
"But this step remains incomplete if it is not followed by giving the Lebanese citizenship to those who deserve it," Sfeir said before his visitors.
 
He also highlighted the difficulty in registering newborns abroad. "There are difficulties faced by the state and emigrants, as departments charged with the registration operations neglect those files." - The Daily Star